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Abstract
The striking growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in recent decades, and the
relevance attributed to its effects led to a booming literature on several aspects of that FDI
and of the multiple dimensions of that impact. However, and although there is extensive
literature on the importance of taxes in location decisions of investments by Multinational
Enterprises (MNEs), an underdeveloped theme is whether MNEs’ subsidiaries pay more
or less taxes than Domestic Enterprises (DEs). Given the lack of empirical work on this
subject, this research is focused on the question: Do foreign owned multinational
subsidiaries pay more taxes than domestic enterprises? Furthermore, we propose also to
investigate whether the domestic companies with foreign subsidiaries pay more or less
taxes than domestic enterprises without foreign subsidiaries, estimating the effect of
internationalization on the taxes paid, accrued or deferred by firms. The dissertation will
undertake, using the Amadeus database, a large-scale cross-country econometric study,
which will be an innovative and ambitious contribution to the literature. The present
research draws upon data for all the EU-28 countries throughout 9 years (2005-2013).
After a detailed literature review on the topic of interest, we perform log-log regressions
to investigate our main research question. The results point to higher levels of taxes paid,
accrued or deferred by MNEs when compared to DEs and higher tax burden borne by
DEs with foreign subsidiaries than DEs without foreign subsidiaries. The measures of the
firm’s size exert a positive influence on tax level, the leverage ratio and the maturity of
the firm also confirm, respectively, the expected negative and positive relation to taxation.
As for the sectors of activity, only the mining and utilities sectors seem to indicate a
positive impact on tax level. Lastly, we extract some conclusions and policy implications
and establish avenues for future research.
JEL Code: F23, H25, H26, I28.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Enterprises, Foreign Subsidiaries,
Domestic Enterprises, Tax Burden, Corporate Income Taxes, Tax Avoidance.
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Resumo
O impressionante crescimento do Investimento Direto Estrangeiro (IDE) nas décadas
recentes e a relevância atribuída ao seu impacto impulsionou uma expansão da literatura
sobre diversos aspetos que caracterizam o IDE e as várias dimensões desse impacto. No
entanto, embora exista vasta literatura sobre a importância dos impostos nas decisões de
localização dos investimentos por parte das empresas multinacionais (EM), um tema
escassamente desenvolvido é se as subsidiárias das EM pagam mais ou menos impostos
do que as empresas domésticas (ED). Dada a quase ausência de trabalhos empíricos sobre
esta temática específica, a presente investigação incidirá sobre a questão: Do foreign
owned multinational subsidiaries pay more taxes than domestic enterprises? Além disso,
propomo-nos também investigar se as ED com subsidiárias no exterior pagam mais ou
menos impostos do que as ED sem subsidiárias estrangeiras, analisando o efeito de
internacionalização nos impostos pagos, vencidos ou diferidos pelas empresas. A
dissertação realiza, utilizando a base de dados Amadeus, um estudo econométrico
abrangendo 28 países, e dados em larga escala, o qual será uma contribuição inovadora e
ambiciosa para a literatura. A presente pesquisa analisa os 28 países membros da União
Europeia durante 9 anos (2005-2013). Após uma revisão detalhada da literatura sobre o
tema de interesse, realizamos regressões log-log para explicar a carga fiscal suportada
pelos distintos grupos de empresas em análise. Os resultados apontam para maiores níveis
de impostos pagos por EM quando comparadas com ED e maior carga fiscal suportada
por ED com subsidiárias estrangeiras do que por ED sem subsidiárias estrangeiras. As
medidas do tamanho da empresa exercem uma influência positiva sobre o nível fiscal, o
rácio de alavancagem e a maturidade da empresa também confirmam, respetivamente, a
relação esperada negativa e positiva com a tributação. Quanto aos setores de atividade,
apenas os setores de mineração e de serviços públicos parecem indicar um impacto
positivo sobre o nível fiscal. Por fim, extraem-se algumas conclusões e implicações de
política, bem como se identificam oportunidades para investigação futura.
Código JEL: F23, H25, H26, I28.
Palavras-chave: Investimento Direto Estrangeiro, Empresas Multinacionais,
Subsidiárias Estrangeiras, Empresas domésticas, Carga Fiscal, Imposto sobre o
Rendimento das Pessoas Coletivas, Evasão Fiscal.
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11. Introduction
The notable growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the last decades sparked a
renewed interest in the effects of FDI on the economic performance of both host and
home countries and in the suitable government policies toward FDI (Fuest, Huber and
Mintz, 2005; Maza, Villaverde, Gutiérrez-Portilla and Gutiérrez-Portilla, 2013).
Nowadays, virtually every country takes part in a “race” to attract FDI (Oxelheim and
Ghauri, 2004), entering in “location tournaments" - policy adjustments, promotional
campaigns and incentives programs to attract investment from Multinational enterprises
(MNEs) (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Belloumi, 2014; Azémar and Dharmapala, 2015).
One of the main types of incentives used are fiscal (i.e. tax-related) incentives (Gergely,
2003; Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné and Lahrèche-Révil, 2005; Jensen, 2013).
Many policy makers believe that the tax burden plays a core role, proving crucial to the
success of government measures in FDI attraction (Baccini, Li and Mirkina, 2014).
Although the sensitivity of FDI to taxation is a widely debated subject (Mutti and Grubert,
2004; Bellak and Leibrecht, 2007; Baccini et al., 2014), no unanimity exists in the
literature on this matter (Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné and Lahrèche-Révil, 2000;
Chakrabarti, 2001; OECD, 2007; Demirhan and Masca, 2008; Moosa, 2009; Tavares-
Lehmann, Coelho and Lehmann, 2012; Shah, 2013).
There is a vast literature on the importance of taxes on the location decisions of MNEs’
investments. However, an under-researched theme is whether MNEs subsidiaries pay
more or less taxes than domestic firms. We propose to contribute to filling this gap in the
empirical literature. Hence, our research question is: Do foreign owned multinational
subsidiaries pay more taxes than domestic enterprises?
Additionally, we intend to investigate whether domestic companies with foreign
subsidiaries pay more or less taxes than domestic firms without foreign subsidiaries,
analyzing the effect of internationalization on the taxes paid by firms.
This dissertation will conduct a large scale cross-country econometric study, aiming to
provide a relevant, ambitious and innovative contribution to this literature.
2The structure of this dissertation is as follows. First, a thorough, state of the art review of
the relevant literature will be provided. Following that, regressions will be performed to
investigate the main research question using appropriate econometric models. These
estimations will draw on the Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk, 2015). The results
obtained will be discussed and conclusions, policy implications and avenues for future
research derived.
32. Literature Review
2.1. Taxation and other determinants of FDI
The sensitivity of FDI to taxation is a much discussed topic (Mutti and Grubert, 2004;
Bellak and Leibrecht, 2007; Baccini et al., 2014), and no consensus exists in the literature
on this matter (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2000; Chakrabarti, 2001; OECD, 2007; Demirhan
and Masca, 2008; Moosa, 2009; Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2012; Shah, 2013; Baccini et
al., 2014).
In fact, the literature remains fairly hesitant concerning whether FDI may be sensitive to
tax incentives. While many earlier studies (Agodo, 1978; Root and Ahmed, 1979; Lim,
1983; Porcano and Price, 1996) considered that taxes were not significant FDI
determinants (an exception being Hartman, 1984), more recent work using more
comprehensive and rigorous measures of taxes concluded that taxes tend to be significant
determinants of FDI attraction (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2000; Devereux, Griffith and
Klemm, 2002; De Mooij and Ederveen, 2005; Demirhan and Masca, 2008; Bellak,
Leibrecht and Damijan, 2009; Baccini et al., 2014), this meaning that MNEs are likely to
locate where they can enjoy fiscal advantages. Recent literature also suggests that
investment location choices are considerably affected by taxes though these effects differ
according to the type of FDI data, sample and tax measure (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005;
De Mooij and Ederveen, 2005; Clark, 2007; De Mooij and Ederveen, 2008; Markle and
Shackelford, 2012; Baccini et al., 2014).
There is widespread evidence that high corporate income tax rates1 are linked to reduced
levels of FDI. This literature has little to say about the association between FDI and high
rates of taxes other than corporate income taxes (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004). However,
the role of non-income taxes can be particularly significant for FDI (OECD, 2007) since
indirect taxes significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign
subsidiaries of American companies (Desai et al., 2004). Also Bénassy-Quéré et al.
(2000) alert for the importance of other taxes, notably social taxes on wages, stating that
the fiscal burden on companies is not restricted to corporate income taxes.
1 The various measures of the corporations’ tax burden are presented and clarified below.
4The negative relationship between tax burden and FDI inflows is confirmed by the
empirical evidence for OECD countries (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2005). Further, studies
using more recent information are found to produce larger semi-elasticities,
demonstrating that FDI is becoming more responsive to taxation over time (OECD,
2007). However, the role of taxes should not be overrated relative to that of other location
determinants (OECD, 2007; Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009). There is endless literature that
has been conducted in order to identify the determinants of FDI but here too, unanimity
was not yet attained (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Chakrabarti, 2001; Blonigen, 2005;
Demirhan and Masca, 2008; Moosa, 2009; Shah, 2013; Baccini et al., 2014). Some
considerations on these other (non-tax related determinants) will be provided
subsequently.
In addition to the importance of taxation in FDI attraction, there are other determining
factors (or, as usually called, determinants) that must be taken into account. For Bellak
and Leibrecht (2009) the host market size and distance between home and host countries
are the most important determinants of net FDI outflows. Similarly Bénassy-Quéré et al.
(2000) and Chakrabarti (2001) found robust support for the explanatory power of the
market size of a host country in its FDI. Also Blonigen and Piger (2014) established a
strong relationship between the variable distance and FDI. The market size, infrastructure
and openness have a positive statistically significant influence on FDI (Demirhan and
Masca, 2008). Likewise according to the OECD (2007) report, well-developed
infrastructure and market size are crucial determinants of FDI inflows.
Policy makers, in an attempt to attract more FDI, try to increase the participation of their
countries in international trade (Demirhan and Masca, 2008) as openness to trade is the
variable most likely to be correlated with FDI attraction, among the controversial
variables (Chakrabarti, 2001). For Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2000), a larger bilateral
openness to trade is linked to further bilateral FDI. In Central and East European
Countries (CEEC), openness had an outstanding positive impact on the inflows of FDI
(Popescu, 2014).
A sound macroeconomic environment, the relatively low unit labor costs and the
Eurozone business cycle had a positive and considerable consequence on FDI inflows in
CEEC (Popescu, 2014). Also in the OECD (2007) report, the macroeconomic stability,
5skilled labor and labor market flexibility are recognized as being important features in
attracting FDI. For developing countries, the coefficient associated with the labor costs is
positive yet not significant, showing that low wages have not been a determining element
in attracting FDI (Demirhan and Masca, 2008).
Hansson and Olofsdotter (2013), by focusing on the EU15 countries, found evidence
concerning the impact on FDI of several variables, namely corporate taxes, technological
externalities and concentration of economic activity. As for corporate taxation, for 19
OECD economies, it was not found any relationship between them and flows of FDI
(Jensen, 2012). The agglomeration economies may mitigate the impact of corporate taxes
(Hansson and Olofsdotter, 2013).
Moreover, high expenditures on research and development (R&D) and a large share of
intensive industries in intermediate goods in the host countries increase foreign
investment flows (Hansson and Olofsdotter, 2013). Moosa (2009) considers that the key
determinants in attracting FDI are GDP growth rate, educational level, R&D spending,
country risk and domestic investment. For Demirhan and Masca (2008), the variable
country risk has a negative sign, but not significant, which reveals that risk has not been
an essential feature in appealing FDI. The high returns linked to host countries may make
the country risk an irrelevant variable (Demirhan and Masca, 2008).
There are other perspectives, which posit that, although market potential has its
importance, the differentials in terms of corporate tax also play a very significant role in
the attraction of FDI flows (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005).
Chakrabarti (2001) presents a possible explanation for the lack of consensus regarding
the relevance of certain variables in determining FDI, arguing that many of the variables
that have been identified as controversial (e.g., taxes, wages, openness, external debt,
political stability) are extremely sensitive to changes “in the conditioning information
set” (Chakrabarti, 2001, p. 108). The substantial uncertainty associated to models of
bilateral FDI patterns is probably due to the adoption of very diverse specifications and
FDI measurement (Blonigen and Piger, 2014). According to Blonigen (2005), given that
the empirical literature on determinants of FDI is still in its infancy, it is thus not
6unexpected that Chakrabarti (2001) has not found statistical significance in most of the
determinants of FDI.
2.2. Costs and Benefits of using Fiscal Incentives
Governments are usually involved in a policy competition motivated by defining strategic
elements of their economic policies (Demirhan and Masca, 2008). More specifically,
when choosing what tax instruments to use and what rates to impose, governments are
frequently influenced by their expectations regarding the effects of taxation on economic
activity, including FDI (Desai et al., 2004). Blonigen and Piger (2014) do not found
robust support for the hypothesis that government policies encourage FDI, with
exceptions for policies that comprise negotiated bilateral agreements. FDI decisions are
influenced by tax policy through changes on the cost of capital and the revenues of diverse
activities (Feldstein, Hines and Hubbard, 1995). Contrariwise, Jensen (2012) considers
that tax policy has no noticeable effect on FDI flows.
On the one hand, if FDI is not sensitive to taxes, host countries could increase their
revenue without sacrificing the economic benefits arising from FDI. On the other hand,
if the volume of FDI decreases with taxation, host countries face a trade-off between the
possible revenue gains from an increase in taxation and the economic costs of
discouraging FDI (Shah and Slemrod, 1991).
For the UK industry, the magnitude of the associated spillover of the presence of foreign
MNEs appears to be less than the incentives per job paid by local governments (Haskel,
Pereira and Slaughter, 2007), which suggests or overestimation of the spillover effects or
the existence of other interests, beyond the spillover effects, on the basis of the incentive
provided.
According to Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005), the impact of tax differentials on FDI is
asymmetric given that while higher tax rates tend to discourage foreign investment
inflows, lower tax rates significantly fail in its attraction. Nonetheless, companies from
low tax countries have a propensity to invest in high tax countries (Hansson and
Olofsdotter, 2013). Hansson and Olofsdotter (2013) found that effective marginal tax rate
in the home country appears to have a greater impact on foreign investment flows than
the effective marginal tax rate in the recipient country. Despite the importance of tax
7differentials for FDI flows, the taxation level should not converge to zero due to the
relevance of market potential and public investment, and also because FDI reacts
asymmetrically to tax differentials so that the high tax countries have no incentive to cut
their taxes (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005).
2.3. Tax Measures
The taxes paid by firms depend on the profitability of their investments, the legal status
of the company and the source of finance. There are several measures that can be used to
compute these taxes – measures based on tax legislation (Statutory Tax Rates – STRs),
measures that take into account the different sources of finance of FDI (Effective Tax
Rates - ETRs), and those considering the international regulations on taxes (Bilateral
Effective Average Tax Rates – BEATRs) (Devereux et al., 2002). STRs indicate the
amount of tax liability relative to taxable income, providing thus only an incomplete
measure of the share of income that corporations pay in taxes because several other
aspects of the tax system (exemptions, tax credits and other incentives) are not taken into
account (OECD, 2007; GAO, 2013). The STRs are a satisfactory indicator of tax burden
in case of financial investment or tax planning measures (Bellak, Leibrecht and Römisch,
2007). The ETRs are frequently divided into Effective Average Tax Rates (EATRs) and
Effective Marginal Tax Rates (EMTRs). While the EATRs are related to the decisions of
where to produce and invest, at home or abroad, the EMTRs refers to the optimal scale
of an investment (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2007). The BEATRs are a conceptually superior
tax measure, combining various features, such as home country, host country,
international and supranational tax rules (Bellak et al., 2007). Sometimes substantial
differences may arise from the use of different measures (Bellak et al., 2007; GAO, 2013).
Whereas each measure has its advantages and disadvantages, the choice of the most
suitable measure of the tax burden should be guided by the underlying research question
(Bellak and Leibrecht, 2007). The results indicate that the use of STRs instead of
BEATRs in empirical surveys of FDI is expected to result in tax rate elasticities that are
too low in absolute value (Bellak et al., 2007). Similarly, GAO (2013) report mentions
that, for the years 2008 to 2010, the average ETRs for large profitable US firms were well
underneath the statutory rate.
8Host country average effective tax rate seem to have a highly significant negative effect
on the location and investment decisions of American manufacturing companies (Grubert
and Mutti, 2000). Grubert and Mutti (2000) claim that a lower ETRs results in an increase
in the after-tax return to capital which in turn is associated with a greater flow of capital.
Tax planning behavior may have significant consequences for the average ETRs on cross-
border investment across a range of cases, such as the type of tax system and/or the type
of recipient country of FDI (low/high tax) (Clark, 2007). Thus, using the STRs can stain
the effects of the tax burden on FDI and lead to doubtful results (Bellak and Leibrecht,
2009). Also De Mooij and Ederveen (2005) states that effective or average tax rates are
thought to be a better approximation of the tax burden on foreign investment. According
to Markle and Shackelford (2012), ETRs for MNEs domiciled in high tax countries are
approximately the double of those located in low tax countries.
The current trend demonstrates that most governments are aware that corporate tax rates
may not be the main factor but are surely one of the most important factors in FDI
attraction. We are witnessing "location tournaments" (Mytelka, 2000), based on policy
measures, promotional campaigns and incentive programs to attract investment by MNEs
(Wheeler and Mody, 1992). In fact, nowadays virtually all countries enter a "race" to
attract FDI (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004) given the anticipated significant benefits to the
host country. The evidence of this "race" is present in the strong reduction of statutory
rates, which fell from an average of 48% at the beginning of the 1980s to 35% at the end
of the 1990s (Devereux et al., 2002). This downward trend remains clear whether we
extend the analysis until more recent years. The average statutory corporate tax rate of 13
Western Europe countries was 49.2% in 1983, having fallen to 27.2% in 2008 (Overesch
and Rincke, 2011). Based on all countries of the European Union, between 2006 and
2014, the average corporate tax rates fell from 24.83% to 21.34%2.
Bellak and Leibrecht (2007) report that the statutory tax rates have been reduced
substantially between 1995 and 2005 along with changes in tax deductions. They claim
that these changes have lowered the overall effective tax burden of foreign investors
2 Corporate tax rates table provided by KPMG and available on
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-rates-
table.aspx.
9significantly. The current downward trend in corporate taxes is essentially the result of
tax competition (Overesch and Rincke, 2011).
Bellak et al. (2007) state that there have been striking changes to statutory tax rates,
accompanied by major changes to the definitions of tax bases. In other words, the tax
bases have been widened as tax rates have dropped. Accordingly, the tax wedge has
increased in several countries as a result of a broadening of the tax base (Devereux,
Lockwood and Redoano, 2008).
Indeed, the most common reform to corporate income taxes over the 1980s and 1990s has
been to reduce tax rates and to broaden tax bases. Furthermore, the effect of this type of
reform has been to reduce the tax rate on profitable investments by more than that on less
profitable investments (Devereux et al., 2002). Although over the last two decades the
ETRs have steadily dropped worldwide, the ordinal rank from high to low tax countries
has changed little (Markle and Shackelford, 2009, 2012).
This recent phenomenon, known as “rate-cutting, base-broadening reforms” (Devereux
et al., 2002, p. 452) or “tax-cut-cum-base broadening reforms” (Bellak and Leibrecht,
2007, p. 11), has remarkable effects on incentives to invest by MNEs. The two sides of
these reforms have countervailing effects on these incentives to invest. If, on the one
hand, lower tax rates typically increase the incentive to invest, on the other hand,
widening the base works in the opposite direction. The combined effect depends on the
minutiae of each reform (Devereux et al., 2002).
The evidence suggests that the whole fall in average statutory tax rates can be explained
by more intense competition induced by the relaxation of capital controls (Devereux et
al., 2008). Devereux et al. (2008) show robust proof that governments respond to changes
in other countries’ taxes. This phenomenon may be due to globalization, which has forced
a “herding effect” (Markle and Shackelford, 2009, p. 35).
2.4. Tax Systems and Double Taxation
Strategic interaction in statutory rates is not well enlightened by concepts such as
“yardstick competition” or “common intellectual trends” (Devereux et al., 2008, p. 1228),
since this interaction in general arises simply among open economies without significant
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capital controls (Devereux et al., 2008). Otherwise, Overesch and Rincke (2011) do not
find any difference in the intensity of tax competition that might be related to different
degrees of openness.
Hines (1999) states that there is a large difference between the taxation of domestic
economic activity and the taxation of international transactions, particularly due to the
possible taxation of the same income by multiple governments. “Double taxation is the
levying of taxes on the same income (or capital) of the same taxpayer in the same period
across two jurisdictions” (Baker, 2014, p. 341). A foreign subsidiary is always subject to
corporate income tax in the host country. Nevertheless, the foreign subsidiary’s earnings
can be taxed once more under the corporate income tax in the home country of the parent
(De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003).3
So, some mechanism is needed to reverse the discouragement to international business
brought by double taxation (Hines, 1999). Countries adopt a particular taxation system
which sets out how the foreign income will be taxed. Among the various methodologies
used, there are two types of systems that have been widely implemented. Territorial
taxation or exemption system happens when foreign income taxed in the host country is
exempt in home country (Fuest et al., 2005). In other words, territorial systems only tax
the domestic income of corporations domiciled in their country (Markle and Shackelford,
2009). Worldwide taxation or credit systems force that tax liabilities in the host country
are credited against taxes in the parent’s home country (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003,
2008; Markle and Shackelford, 2009). Credit systems deny certain benefits to foreign
investors (Mutti and Grubert, 1985). Whereas the generalization of territorial systems in
the EU would intensify FDI inflows, the generalization of worldwide systems in the same
area would lessen these flows, because it would take away the opportunity to avoid high
tax rates at home country (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2000). Recently, the trend adopted by
many countries is the movement from worldwide to territorial taxation schemes (Markle
and Shackelford, 2009).
3 If the regime is Worldwide Taxation, like in the US.
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Gravelle (2009) argues that a territorial taxation system allows companies to increase the
opportunities for profit shifting. In turn, Mills and Newberry (2004) do not find evidence
of enhanced profit shifting possibilities under territorial systems.
Since most of their activities happen in the home country, the location of the MNEs’s
parent has a major effect on its worldwide tax liability whereas the locations of its foreign
subsidiaries have much less impact (Markle and Shackelford, 2012). In an integrated area
like the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it is likely that tax competition results in
the convergence of tax rates to the lowest continental level (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005).
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) claim that the impact of tax differentials is not homogeneous
explaining that, when FDI comes from credit system countries, the impact of large tax
differentials is stronger than those of narrow tax differentials. In turn, when FDI originates
from exemption countries, such asymmetry does not happen. In this case, a linear reaction
occurs (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005).
To avoid double taxation of FDI in host and home country most countries formalize
double taxation treaties (DTTs) based on the OECD Model Tax Convention (De Mooij
and Ederveen, 2003). Nevertheless, authors like Baker (2014) do not found statistically
significant effect of DTTs on FDI.
When the systems of taxation on foreign-source income of resident multinationals are
particularly complex, considerable costs may arise for companies to comply with the
system, complicating long-term planning decisions – hence, increasing compliance costs.
Blumenthal and Slemrod (1995) state that the compliance costs of large American
corporations are disproportionately larger than the aggregate share of assets, sales and
employment that is abroad. For European MNEs, these compliance costs related to
foreign source income are not greater than for domestic operations (Blumenthal and
Slemrod, 1995). FDI decisions of MNEs are influenced by tax systems through this
sometimes complicated interaction between domestic and host taxation and
dissimilarities in the tax treatments of debt and equity finance (Feldstein et al., 1995).
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2.5. Tax Competition, Profit Shifting and related issues
The substantial economic and political benefits often associated to FDI contrast with
possible distortions caused by public policy. Associated to the continuous pursuit of FDI
by international investors is the possibility of a "race to the bottom" in welfare
expenditure, labor protection and corporate tax rates (Jensen, 2013). Indeed, the countries
competing for FDI may have incentives to reduce taxes to levels below what they would
be in the absence of international competition (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006b).
According to Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2000), the tax competition among member states can
lead either to inefficiently high or low taxation levels.
Tax competition for mobile capital has been “on the table” in the political debate of
several EU Member States against the background of the EU enlargement. In particular,
CEEC have often been accused of engaging in aggressive tax competition for FDI (Bellak
and Leibrecht, 2007).
Lately, the OECD and the EU have shown increasing concern with tax competition. In
addition to the implementation of a "code of conduct" to limit the scope of tax
competition, the EU has restricted the degree of freedom of the member countries
concerning tax avoidance through various strategies that discriminate between domestic
and foreigners owners of capital. The project "harmful tax competition" implemented by
the OECD goes in the same direction, aiming to remove incentives to change tax bases to
low tax jurisdictions (Fuest et al., 2005).
Profit shifting is empirically important since it allows to MNEs change their profits from
one country to another in order to reduce their overall fiscal responsibilities (OECD,
2007; Devereux et al., 2008). For Europe, there is evidence of profit shifting more
pronounced than debt shifting (Egger, Eggert and Winner, 2010b). However, debt shifting
is a broadly used practice in worldwide tax planning of MNEs (Egger, Eggert,
Keuschnigg and Winner, 2010a). Devereux et al. (2008) stated that the necessary
incentive for profit shifting is grounded on differences in statutory rates between
jurisdictions. Similarly, the relatively large elasticity of profit shifting may clarify why
countries engage in fierce competition with their statutory tax rates in order to attract
multinational profits (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2008). MNEs earn significantly higher
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profits than domestic counterparts in low tax countries but significantly lower ones in high
tax countries (Egger et al., 2010b). Countries with a low tax rate could be considered as
a potential location of profit shifting activities (Gravelle, 2009).
In addition to the use of offshore operations to reallocate profits away from high tax
jurisdictions, it is furthermore conceivable that tax havens can be advantageous for
multinational companies which face repatriation taxes from activities in low tax countries
(Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006a). Tax havens allow US corporations operate in other
foreign high tax countries without penalty since all foreign income and taxes paid are
added together in the calculation of the foreign tax credit issued by the US authorities
(Barry, 2005). For Markle and Shackelford (2009), the influence of tax havens on US
parents’ ETRs is not as significant as might be inferred by some political statements. It is
also believed that tax havens accelerate the process of tax competition among
governments (Desai et al., 2006b).
These countries known as tax havens are “low-tax foreign countries that offer advanced
communication facilities, promote themselves as offshore financial centers, and
frequently feature legislation promoting business or bank secrecy” (Desai et al., 2006a,
p. 519). Hines and Rice (1994) concluded that the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue for
a representative tax haven is nearby 6%. It is expected that MNEs are differentially
attracted to places with lower labor costs, lower taxes, and a greater domestic market,
ceteris paribus (Wheeler and Mody, 1992).
It is remarkable that, in spite of the argument of low tax rates, a relatively small number
of MNEs relocate their corporate homes to tax havens. On the one hand, this reflects the
tax and regulatory costs of doing so. On the other hand, it also reflects the unwillingness
of governments to levy extremely heavy tax burdens that encourage widespread
departures (Hines, 1999).
There is a strong presumption that tax havens are strongly related with tax avoidance
purposes by MNEs (Desai et al., 2006a). International tax evasion is clearly a successful
activity and it can arise from wealthy individual investors and from bulky multinational
companies (Gravelle, 2009).
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Gravelle (2009) makes an interesting and important distinction between tax avoidance
and evasion, noting that the first is sometimes used to refer to legal reductions in taxes,
while the second refers to tax reductions that are considered illegal.
The reported profitability of MNEs is inversely related to local tax rates, a correlation that
is, at least in part, the consequence of tax-motivated use of debt financing, the pricing of
intrafirm transfers, royalty payments, and other techniques (Hines, 1999; Egger et al.,
2010b). Although this relationship varies amid developed and developing countries,
factors associated with enterprise mobility are related with lower levels of taxation
(Jensen, 2013). In the US, foreign multinationals adopt tax-motivated income reporting
strategies (Mills and Newberry, 2004).
Companies have a motivation to raise leverage above the optimal level without taxation
due to the deductibility of interest on debt from the tax base whereas the return on equity
does not allow that deductibility (Egger et al., 2010a). On average, foreign owned
enterprises display a meaningfully higher debt ratio than their domestically owned
counterparts in the host country. Also according to Egger et al. (2010a), this tax-
motivated advantage of debt enlarges with the STR, nevertheless the MNEs are capable
to minimize their tax payments via distributing debt over locations where they operates.
It is widely suspected that MNEs use the aggressive transfer pricing for within-firm
transactions in order to reduce their tax obligations (Feldstein et al., 1995; Desai et al.,
2006a; Egger et al., 2010b). Furthermore, Barry (2005) adds that, in the presence of such
transfer pricing activities, the application of conventional measures of R&D intensity
(expenditures on R&D as a share of output) results in its underestimation for low tax
countries.
International transfers of goods and services in transactions within the firm should be
carried out at arm’s-length prices, i.e., prices that would be used in a similar transaction
between unrelated companies (Hines and Rice, 1994; Barry, 2005). However, for the
majority of intangible assets, there are no arm’s-length prices which complicates the
implementation and monitoring of the reasonableness of the prices charged within
corporations (Barry, 2005). When market prices are not available, MNEs may distort the
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transfer price in order to shift taxable income to the jurisdiction where taxes are lower
(Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2000; Fuest et al., 2005; Markle and Shackelford, 2009).
Whether they are incorporated in tax rules or in tax rates, tax incentives influence the
decisions of MNEs (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005). The reported income by multinational
companies varies significantly with worldwide tax incentives of their foreign parent
corporations (Mills and Newberry, 2004).
The contractual arrangements between related parties placed in countries with different
tax rates offer countless possibilities of sophisticated tax evasion (Desai et al., 2006a).
Further, Desai et al. (2006a) explain that multinational companies may structure a variety
of transactions (intrafirm debt, royalty payments, dividend repatriations, and intrafirm
trade) in a way that is favorable to tax evasion.
Companies that face higher tax rates use more intensively debt than those that face lower
tax rates (Graham, 2003). Likewise, on their balance sheets, MNEs in high tax rate
countries have much more debt than those in low tax rate countries (Altshuler and
Grubert, 2003; Mills and Newberry, 2004). Corporations can get away with relative ease,
avoiding the burden of high liabilities on repatriations (Altshuler and Grubert, 2003).
As measured by their declared income, US MNEs locate a considerable fraction of their
foreign activity in tax havens. Yet, it seems that this fraction includes reported profits that
typically would not be earned by factors employed by American companies in the havens
(Hines and Rice, 1994).
On average, American MNEs report that the fraction of their worldwide income earned
in the US is meaningfully less that the fraction of their worldwide assets, sales or payroll
that is in the US. One could argue that this implies that foreign operations are relatively
more lucrative than domestic operations. However, it is likely that these results may also
reflect the successful shifting of the chargeable income outside the US (Shackelford and
Slemrod, 1998). Egger et al. (2010b) found a significant saving on profit tax for MNEs
operating in high tax host countries. Further, this tax saving is more pronounced in larger
and older firms (Egger et al., 2010b).
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Gravelle (2009) states that, in particular in the US, there was the need to undertake some
steps to mitigate the rewards of profit shifting activities. Recently some prevalent
measures have been discussed and its amendment has often been suggested. It should be
noted, among such measures, the occurrence of a substantial reduction in the corporate
tax rate (from 35% to 24%), the repeal of the deferral possibility and the imposition of a
per country foreign tax credit limit (Gravelle, 2009).
2.6. Multinational vs Domestic Firms
The heart of the matter is that, although (as shown before) there is a host of literature on
related issues, little is known empirically about whether MNEs pay more or less taxes
than domestic firms (among the exceptions are Shackelford and Slemrod, 1998; Markle
and Shackelford, 2009, 2012; and Egger et al., 2010b). Moreover, recent cases of high
profile companies paying reduced tax amounts sparked this debate. A recent example4 is
the apparent tax agreement between Amazon and the government of Luxembourg,
following a controversy on an unfair state aid that may have allowed the company to
underpay its taxes over several years5. These types of cases of favorable tax treatment for
MNEs necessarily leads to concerns about smaller domestic companies, which in turn are
paying a disproportionate share of the taxes (Markle and Shackelford, 2009).
The results found by Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) seem to point to the successful
shifting of taxable income out of the U.S., suggesting that the tax burden is shifted from
domestic corporations to MNEs. After all, for Markle and Shackelford (2009), MNEs and
their domestic counterparts face similar ETRs. The evidence supports neither statements
that MNEs regularly pay lower taxes nor claims that MNEs consistently operate at a tax
disadvantage compared with their domestic counterparts (Markle and Shackelford, 2012).
Egger et al. (2010b) state that profit tax expenditures of foreign owned enterprises are
4 Available on http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/business/amazon-luxembourg-european-
commission.html?_r=0.
5 Recently (December, 2014), Google was charged of deliberately understating its profits by charging its
UK operations too much for the use of overseas-owned intellectual property. The UK government
responded by threatening to impose the measure that was became known as “Google tax”. It represents a
revolution in tax policy, to the extent that introduces the idea that the volume of sales in a particular country
should determine the tax paid in that country. There are many other companies that carried out the same
type of Google practices, notably Apple, Amazon and Starbucks, inter alia
(http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30420571).
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inferior to those of domestic companies in high tax countries though higher in low tax
countries.
For Markle and Shackelford (2012), there is no a global pattern about the tax burden faced
by multinationals and their domestic counterparts. While in some countries are
multinationals that faced higher effective tax rates, in other countries the reverse is true
(Markle and Shackelford, 2012). Specifically for US corporations, another opinion is
defended, which argues that foreign controlled US firms pay less taxes than do American
owned US firms (GAO, 2008).
After all the literature surveyed with regard to key issues related to the topic, in section 3
we proceed with a large cross-country empirical investigation to explore our main
research question, i.e., whether MNEs pay more taxes than DEs.
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3. Empirical Investigation
3.1. Data
The empirical part of this dissertation is based on the Amadeus database focused on the
European Union-28 countries. Amadeus is a Bureau Van Dijk’s database, which provides
comparable financial and business information on Europe’s public and private
companies. This online tool covers 43 countries and it contains comprehensive
information on around 21 million companies across Europe. In this way, Amadeus
enables us to obtain data about relevant variables for the present study, such as: age,
sector, size, taxation, and assets, among others.
The resulting database used to conduct the estimations was collected in June 2015. In
order to serve the purposes of the present dissertation, the final database was divided into
three distinct types of companies:
 Multinational Enterprises (MNEs);
 Domestic Enterprises (DEs) with foreign subsidiaries;
 DEs without foreign subsidiaries.
To identify MNEs, we applied the criterion that selects firms owned by a foreign
shareholder, wherein the direct or total participation is greater than 50% (majority
ownership) in the company.6 When this criterion is used in the negative form, Amadeus
database excludes MNEs and presents us only DEs. It is a criterion used for selecting and
excluding observations depending on how it is applied. Further, we split the last group
(DEs) into two, applying the criterion that identifies corporations that own a foreign
subsidiary, being that direct or total percentage of ownership in its foreign subsidiary of
at least 50%. Thus we obtain DEs with foreign subsidiaries, and the other DEs in the
sample are considered DEs without foreign subsidiaries, as they do not have majority
ownership of any foreign subsidiaries.
The observations were collected for nine years, from 2005 to 2013, given that we intended
to gather a relatively significant number of years to obtain a robust empirical base and
also not to restrict our sample to the recent years of deep economic and financial crisis.
6 Like this, it is undeniable that the issue of control by a foreign multinational enterprise is ensured. Majority
ownership is very often the criterion used to determine the ownership of the company.
19
Although Amadeus provides data from 2005 to 2014, we decided to exclude from the
analysis the last year available, 2014, since the information about the companies was
rather incomplete for that year, which would hinder the reliability of our data.
The criteria used to select the companies (applied in all extractions) considered for the
analysis were: all firms with an active status and also companies with at least 10
employees. The latter aimed to exclude micro enterprises, following the definition of the
European Commission (EC, 2003) that considers micro enterprises are those that employ
less than 10 workers. We needed to be selective given the overwhelming number of
observations in the database, thus we imposed a criterion of minimum size, deciding to
exclude the micro enterprises (which we feared would distort the analysis of taxation). In
the same Commission report, the EC also refers to annual turnover and annual balance
sheet total measures. However, we opted for the criterion of the number of employees
given the greater stability of total employment compared to other measures as size
measures of the corporations. Using the Amadeus database, we realize that we can apply
a particular criterion for some recent years, with the maximum limit of four years.
Therefore, and being our analysis wider (nine years), we decided not to apply this
criterion to all recent years available on the database as it would be restricted to the years
of crisis. That said, we decided to choose as the criterion for the minimum number of
employees, the last year of analysis, 2013, which is often a strategy used in the Amadeus
dataset.
Subsequently, since we intend to study the taxation level borne by companies, we
excluded from the sample all observations with missing values of our key variable
“taxation”. Additionally, and taking the countless diversity associated to different sectors
(we had NACE at four digits in the sample), we considered unreasonable to create
variables for all sectors. In this way, we consolidated key sectors such as mining,
manufacturing, utilities, construction and services.
After detecting a few cases where the companies’ date of incorporation was more recent
than the last year of analysis (2013), we excluded these observations from our sample
with the purpose of not invalidating the reliability of variable age which is built on the
date of incorporation. Plus, it would not make any sense, if our dataset would be only
until 2013, to include these few odd cases with date of incorporation after 2013.
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conclude further methodological step consisted in undertaking took logarithmic
transformations of the variables in order to implement to the model adopted in the
empirical part, which is described in detail in section 3.4. For this purpose, we had to drop
all non-positive observations associated to variables that suffered logarithmic
transformation.
After all these steps, we ended up with a still very impressive number of observations for
each year. Figure 2 in appendix, summarizes the procedures used in the data treatment
process and the respective implications in the number of observations.
Under these conditions, the final database for the period 2005-2013 is composed by
3,526,552 observations. As stated above, this sample was divided into three different
groups including 368,215 (10.44%) MNEs, 152,324 (4.32%) DEs with foreign
subsidiaries and 3,006,013 (85.24%) DEs without foreign subsidiaries. For a clearer
overview, see Table 1.
Table 1: Number of companies in each group of companies (Period 2005-2013)
All
observations 3,526,552
MNEs 368,215
DEs 3,158,337
With foreign
subsidiaries 152,324
Without
foreign
subsidiaries
3,006,013
Source: Own elaboration.
3.2. Descriptive Analysis
In this section, we provide a more detailed analysis of the data in the sample. Five distinct
measures are used for this descriptive study. The measures of central tendency are mean,
median, maximum and minimum value, while standard deviation is our measure of the
dispersion of the sample. The relevant descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2 and
3.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (2005-2013): MNEs
MNEs
Observations
Mean Median MinimumValue
Maximum
Value
Standard
Deviation
Taxation
(th €) 1,827.8 165.1 0.0 9,793,520.1 41,894.0 368,215
Number of
Employees 256.4 58.0 0.0 263,517.0 1,842.6 341,492
Sales
(th €) 81,004.0 11,619.8 0.0 98,501,445.0 653,215.1 294,613
Fixed assets
(th €) 40,912.7 1,300.0 0.0 150,300,000.0 731,115.2 362,348
Total assets
(th €) 86,749.1 8,807.5 0.4 593,900,000.0 1,590,860.0 356,224
Gearing
(%) 81.4 24.6 0.0 1,000.0 142.2 312,758
Age (Years) 19.8 15.0 0.0 313.0 18.7 368,215
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (2005-2013): DEs
DEs
Observations
Mean Median MinimumValue
Maximum
Value
Standard
Deviation
Taxation
(th €) 484.1 29.7 0.0 18,818,710.0 29,328.0 3,158,337
Number of
Employees 101.9 21.0 0.0 648,254.0 2,006.2 2,763,706
Sales
(th €) 15,653.4 2,387.5 0.0 144,200,000.0 295,818.6 2,828,764
Fixed assets
(th €) 14,429.8 410.3 0.0 180,700,000.0 578,083.8 3,055,795
Total assets
(th €) 24,926.8 1,881.7 0.0 256,700,000.0 777,340.0 2,992,455
Gearing
(%) 116.3 48.2 0.0 1,000.0 171.5 2,727,913
Age (Years) 18.4 15.0 0.0 813.0 17.1 3,158,337
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
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Confronting our two interest groups (MNEs and DEs) and taking as backdrop the whole
period of our analysis (2005-2013), we can make several relevant inferences. Considering
their mean values, MNEs present in general higher values for most variables under
consideration, when compared with DEs. On average MNEs pay 3 times more taxes,
employ 2 times more people, and sell 5 times more than DEs. This analysis can be
extended to other variables, such as fixed and total assets, where MNEs own 2 times more
and 3 times more of such assets than DEs, respectively. Furthermore, MNEs have 30.0%
lower gearing, i.e., the measure of the firm’s leverage level as indicator of the companie’s
performance has, on average, higher values in DEs than in MNEs. The age of the firm,
which corresponds to difference between a given year of our analysis and the enterprise’s
year of incorporation, as referred in more detail below in section 3.3.1.3., reflects that
MNEs are on average one year older than DEs.
After obtaining our data broken down by sectors, a descriptive analysis of the same kind
was undertaken for companies in each of the sectors under review – notably services,
mining, manufacturing, utilities and construction, which is displayed in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7
and 8, respectively.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics (2005-2013): Services - MNEs vs DEs
By Sector: Services
MNEs DEs
Mean Observations Mean Observations
Taxation
(th €) 1,159.2 225,598 389.3 1,752,337
Number of
Employees 237.5 207,963 115.4 1,539,008
Sales
(th €) 68,975.2 178,402 14,710.1 1,551,950
Fixed assets
(th €) 30,446.9 222,179 14,425.2 1,703,297
Total assets
(th €) 72,168.9 217,976 23,666.6 1,663,468
Gearing
(%) 79.9 191,009 113.9 1,498,684
Age (2013)
(Years) 18.2 225,598 17.4 1,752,337
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
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For the period under analysis (2005-2013), companies established in the services’ sector
follow in line with the overall pattern seen previously, although in absolute values, both
pay slightly less taxes, on average. Specifically, MNEs pay more taxes, employ more and
sell more when compared with DEs, although differences are somewhat smaller. The
same applies to fixed and total assets where there are no substantial differences comparing
to the general picture. More, MNEs present 29.9% lower gearing, very close value to that
seen in the overall analysis. Compared to that previous analysis, also differences
associated to age of companies do not show noteworthy modifications.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics (2005-2013): Mining - MNEs vs DEs
By Sector: Mining
MNEs DEs
Mean Observations Mean Observations
Taxation
(th €) 66,617.3 2,796 16,563.7 14,627
Number of
Employees 1,431.6 2,662 270.2 12,994
Sales
(th €) 403,357.1 1,828 59,622.3 12,812
Fixed assets
(th €) 842,710.8 2,779 204,446.4 14,266
Total assets
(th €) 1,327,233.0 2,747 314,038.4 14,026
Gearing
(%) 89.7 2,428 99.7 12,948
Age (2013)
(Years) 23.4 2,796 24.4 14,627
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
Regarding to mining for same period, the discrepancy is huge – in absolute values, MNEs
and DEs pay far more in the mining sector, compared with the global settings. The mean
values related between the two groups under consideration deviate slightly from the mean
values presented without the sectoral division. In respect to taxation in absolute values.
On average, MNEs continue to pay more taxes than DEs and in this regard there is no
substantial difference. Although MNEs employ and sell more compared to DEs, these
differences increase considerably relatively to the overall picture. The equivalent applies
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to fixed and total assets, where the dissimilarities widened noticeably. Further, MNEs
present 10.0% lower gearing (substantially lower value than 30.0% - reference value).
Unlike the overall picture, MNEs are younger around one year than DEs in the mining.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics (2005-2013): Manufacturing - MNEs vs DEs
By Sector: Manufacturing
MNEs DEs
Mean Observations Mean Observations
Taxation
(th €) 1,543.8 121,231 446.7 894,766
Number of
Employees 265.3 113,612 90.5 781,479
Sales
(th €) 92,644.0 98,944 17,266.6 815,693
Fixed assets
(th €) 35,521.2 119,050 9,979.1 855,690
Total assets
(th €) 77,379.4 117,445 20,571.9 841,251
Gearing
(%) 83.0 103,903 124.3 787,458
Age (2013)
(Years) 23.1 121,231 21.1 894,766
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
As to manufacturing for the period 2005-2013 we also found some deviations from the
pattern seen earlier. Nevertheless, in absolute values, the amount of taxes paid, accrued
or deferred by MNEs and DEs in the manufacturing sector is the closest to the main
picture. On average, MNEs continue paying about 3 times more taxes than DEs.
Concerning the number of employees and sales, the differences remain in the same
direction and are slightly more pronounced. Compared to the overall analysis, the
differences on assets also widen, especially in terms of fixed assets (from 2 times more
to 3 times more). About the variable gearing, there is no substantial modification (MNEs
have 33.2% lower gearing). In the manufacturing sector, the difference about the age of
companies widens for two years, continuing MNEs to be older, on average.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics (2005-2013): Utilities - MNEs vs DEs
By Sector: Utilities
MNEs DEs
Mean Observations Mean Observations
Taxation
(th €) 4,838.0 5,947 2,140.3 57,934
Number of
Employees 266.4 5,610 177.1 51,655
Sales
(th €) 255,521.2 4,929 69,531.6 53,839
Fixed assets
(th €) 224,455.3 5,878 112,085.9 56,100
Total assets
(th €) 320,749.9 5,798 153,845.1 55,383
Gearing
(%) 102.7 5,043 121.1 50,900
Age (2013)
(Years) 15.4 5,947 18.3 57,934
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
Comparing to the overall picture, MNEs and DEs in utilities sector pay substantially more
taxes, about 3 times more in absolute values. In the utilities sector, for the same period,
the difference in mean values associated to the two groups under consideration are largely
identical to the difference in mean values presented earlier. On average, MNEs continue
to pay more taxes than DEs although the difference has fallen from 3 times more to
slightly more than to 2 times. Similarly in terms of number of employees and sales, the
differences are smaller. These two measures of firms’ size indicate a slight approximation
between MNEs and DEs. In utilities, the fixed and total assets owned by MNEs and DEs
follow same pattern as the overall analysis, despite the slight drop in the difference in
terms of total assets. The difference concerning the leverage level measured by the
gearing ratio remained in the same direction even though it declined from 30.0% to
15.2%, i.e., MNEs present 15.2% lower gearing than DEs in the utilities. Contrary to the
general picture, MNEs are younger about three years than DEs in this sector.
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics (2005-2013): Construction - MNEs vs DEs
By Sector: Construction
MNEs DEs
Mean Observations Mean Observations
Taxation
(th €) 737.0 12,643 184.4 438,673
Number of
Employees 234.1 11,645 54.4 378,570
Sales
(th €) 37,692.1 10,510 7,247.1 394,470
Fixed assets
(th €) 13,636.1 12,462 4,174.7 426,442
Total assets
(th €) 47,116.6 12,258 11,934.6 418,327
Gearing
(%) 81.7 10,375 108.5 377,923
Age (2013)
(Years) 18.6 12,643 16.8 438,673
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
Regarding to construction, for the period under analysis, the inverse happens to that in
utilities sector in terms of absolute values borne with taxes by companies, on average. In
the construction sector, MNEs and DEs pay approximately 3 times less comparing to the
overall picture. Concerning the mean values connected to MNEs and DEs deviate slightly
from the mean values presented without the sectoral division. Herein there is some
differences that increase: MNEs pay taxes around 4 times more instead of 3 times, employ
nearly 4 times more instead of 2 times and sell more than 6 times more in place of 5 times.
As to assets, there is an increase in differences between MNEs and DEs, from 2 to 3 times
more and from 3 to 4 times more, roughly and respectively. Regarding to gearing, there
is no considerable modifications (MNEs present 24.7% lower gearing than DEs). In the
construction, the difference about aging of companies is slightly larger than the overall
picture, i.e., MNEs are approximately two years older than DEs, on average.
Concluding, MNEs and DEs, in services and manufacturing sectors present similar tax
levels to those seen in the general picture, in absolute values and on average. In the
utilities sector, the tax burden borne by two groups of companies are, on average, three
times more comparing to the overall picture, whereas in the construction sector, the
reverse happens, approximately. The highlight is the mining sector, where MNEs and
DEs have, on average, tax levels that significantly exceed the general context.
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3.3. Methodology
After the minucious explanations of the data collection procedures and its descriptive
analysis, this section aims to present the models adopted to test econometrically whether
MNEs pay more taxes than DEs. Furthermore, all the variables included in the models,
the type of model adopted and the software used to implement the estimations will be
explained in this section. To conclude this section, the achieved results of the econometric
estimations will be presented.
3.3.1. Variables
As mentioned in the literature review, the main objective of this dissertation is to ascertain
whether foreign owned multinational subsidiaries pay more or less taxes than domestic
enterprises. Hence, we needed to gather a relevant array of variables to address all the
matters described in the literature review. This part presents and describes the dependent
and independent variables used to investigate our research question.
3.3.1.1. Dependent Variable: Taxation
To analyze the level of taxes paid by enterprises, we will use the taxation variable
(taxation) as proxy. Taking into account our claims, we preferred the absolute variable
taxation to the detriment of the relative variable taxation per employee since the latter is
very dependent on the sector under analysis. Assuming a certain level taxes, while in
some economic activities the use of employees is high, which decreases the ratio taxation
per employee, in other sectors the use of workers is highly replaced by the use of
machinery. However, to ascertain whether some companies pay more taxes than others,
we needed a variable of effectively paid taxes, which the Amadeus database did not
provide, whereby we had to work with the best available proxy. Our variable taxation
refers to all taxes related to the accounting period (paid, accrued or deferred).
3.3.1.2. Main Independent Variable: Multinational Enterprise
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the multinational enterprise status, since we
intend to analyse the tax level burden by multinational companies versus their domestic
counterparts. For that reason, our main explanatory or independent variable is a binary
variable/dummy (mne), which is equal to 1 if the company is a foreign multinational
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subsidiary7 and equal to 0 otherwise (meaning that the enterprise is domestic). As
multinationals are, on average, larger companies, associated with them is expected a
positive sign of influence on variable taxation.
3.3.1.3. Other Independent Variables
Additionally, we propose to evaluate the effect of internationalization (via outward FDI)
on the taxes paid by domestic companies, i.e., whether DEs internationalized via FDI pay
more or less taxes than DEs without foreign subsidiaries. For this, we split domestic firms
into two distinct groups: with and without foreign subsidiaries. That way, emerges
another crucial dichotomous variable (dew) that assumes the value 1 if the company owns
a foreign subsidiary and the value 0 otherwise (meaning that besides being a domestic
firm, it does not own any foreign subsidiary). Due to the unpredictability about the
expected sign of the variable dew on taxation, it remains undetermined.
It is widely accepted by the scientific community that it may be problematic to include
companies from different sectors (such as agriculture, manufacturing, education,
construction, services, among others) in the same analysis group. The particular case of
the California industry shows that the sectors are extremely broad and are at times not
comparable across regions (Dean Runyan Associates, 2009). Indeed, different industries
have dissimilar industrial structures and characteristics, facing profoundly different
competitive and economic environments and profit forecasts, which makes them
incomparable (Qin, Chang, Li and Li, 2014). To conclude, “Different enterprises face
different situations…different industry sectors do not have comparability, and then
enterprises in different sectors are also not comparable.” (Qin et al., 2014, p. 32). We
generated an independent variable which identifies the comparable sectors, i.e., we
adopted a binary variable “nace”, taking the value 1 when companies are set in the mining,
manufacturing, utilities, construction or services and the value 0 otherwise. This variable
was built on the “NACE Rev. 2 primary code” extracted by Amadeus database, which
incorporates the 4-digit NACE code. There, we drop all observations for which “nace” is
equal to zero. Next, to allocate the different codes to diverse sectors, we used the approach
7 A firm is considered a foreign MNE subsidiary when a non-resident entity owns at least 10% of its equity.
Some studies consider a cut-off of 10% and others of 50% (majority ownership). In this dissertation we use
the concept of majority ownership, which is unequivocal and very frequent in related literature.
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outlined in Eurostat’s publication (Eurostat, 2008). This way, and after we have kept only
the five sectors of interest, we generated four dummies (mining, manuf, utilit and
construc). Every one these explanatory variables takes the value 1 when companies
belong to the sector in question and the value 0 otherwise. To conclude, and to clarify the
procedure adopted, companies that are not identified in any of these four binary variables
correspond to services. The sign expected of the coefficients connected to different
sectors is also undetermined, given the diversity and complexity associated to them and
even within each one.
Another explanatory feature of tax effort borne by companies is its size. It will be proxied
by total employment (empl), measured as the number of employees in each corporation.
Alternatively, as measures of size of the company, we will use the total sales (sales) and
finally the fixed and total assets accessible to the enterprise (fixasset and totasset). It is
conceivable that larger companies pay more taxes; consequently, the measures of a firm’s
size have an expected positive sign.
The financial aspects inherent to the entities are very useful in order to assess for example
the long-term financial stability, expanding the horizons. Hence we have chosen to
analyze the effect of the company’s leverage on taxation through the use of the gearing
ratio (gearing). Assuming that the largest companies are those that invest more, they
possess more loans and as such they have higher leverage ratios. Thus, it is expected a
negative sign of the influence of gearing on taxation.
One more characteristic considered is the “maturity” of the enterprise. The independent
variable that we will assume as proxy to that is the age of corporation itself (age). This
variable was built by the difference between each of the years of the sample and the
companies’ date of incorporation (obtained from Amadeus). While the newer companies
are still in their infancy (phases of research and investment), older companies already
have their portfolio of products, services and more established clients. As such, it is
expected that older companies are larger and, therefore, pay more taxes - positive sign on
taxation.
Table 9 summarizes the most relevant information about the independent variables.
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Table 9: Synthesis of the independent variables
Measure IndependentVariable Description Unit
Variable
Name on
Stata
Expected
Sign on
Taxation
Company’s
status
Multinational
Enterprise
Binary variable:
1=company owned by a
foreign shareholder,
0=domestic company
{0,1} mne +
Domestic
Enterprise
with Foreign
Subsidiary
Binary variable:
1=domestic company
with foreign subsidiary,
0=domestic company
without foreign
subsidiary
{0,1} dew ?
Size
Employment Number of employees Number ofemployees empl +
Sales Total sales Thousandseuros sales +
Fixed Assets Fixed assets Thousandseuros fixasset +
Total Assets Total assets Thousandseuros totasset +
Financial Leverage Leverage/gearing Percentage gearing -
Sector
Mining Binary variable: 1=companies in the mining {0,1} mining ?
Manufacturing
Binary variable: 1=
companies in the
manufacturing
{0,1} manuf ?
Utilities
Binary variable: 1=
companies in the
utilities
{0,1} utilit ?
Construction
Binary variable: 1=
companies in the
construction
{0,1} construc ?
Age Company’sAge
Number of years from
the date of incorporation
to each of the years
Years age +
Source: Own elaboration.
After the logarithmic transformation of variables, all non-binary variables (those that have
changed) came to possess in its name the letter “l” at the beginning to identify that it is a
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logarithmic variable (new variable names and its definitions are in Table 16 of the
Appendix).
3.4. Econometric Model
It is fundamental to remember that our central research question is to ascertain if MNEs
pay more or less taxes than DEs. For that, we have to apply a model that allows us to
analyze the effect of the distinct chosen variables on the level of taxes owed. Thence, we
decided to adopt a log-log model (using the base 10 logarithm) in order to achieve our
goals.
Logarithmically transforming variables in a regression model predominantly seeks to
handle situations where a non-linear relationship exists between the explained and
explanatory variables (Benoit, 2011). Going further, the use of logarithms for the
dependent and independent variables is the most used methodology in econometrics for
allowing nonlinear relationships between them (Wooldridge, 2012). Using the logarithm
of one or more variables as an alternative of the un-logged form makes the effective
relationship non-linear, while still preserving the linear model (Benoit, 2011).
Furthermore, “logarithmic transformations are also a convenient means of transforming
a highly skewed variable into one that is more approximately normal” (Benoit, 2011, p.
2). Indeed, there is a distribution whose logarithm is normally distributed but whose
untransformed scale is skewed, known as log-normal distribution (Benoit, 2011). This is
the essence of our choice for a log-log model. To carry out regressions we run the
command regress.
We then proceeded to test, as usual in this type of models, for skewness and kurtosis.
“Lack of symmetry (skewness) and pointiness (kurtosis) are two main ways in which a
distribution can deviate from normal” (Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012, p. 487). The
skewness is an indicator used in distribution analysis as a sign of asymmetry and deviation
from a normal distribution (Bai and Ng, 2005). After we had implemented (using Stata
12.0) the test for skewness designed for the variable taxation, we concluded that our
dependent variable is highly skewed. This test assumed the value 334.8, whereas the
reference skewness value to consider the mean equal to median is 0, i.e., the distribution
is symmetrical around the mean when the skewness value is close to 0. Our result
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indicates undoubtedly that taxation presents a right skewed distribution, and that most of
the values are concentrated on left of the mean, with extreme values to the right.
Regarding kurtosis, it is an indicator used in distribution analysis as a sign of flattening
of a distribution (DeCarlo, 1997). For this test, our result is 161,575.2 which is well above
to reference value 3 that characterizes a normal distribution. This means high probability
of extreme values (Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012). Once completed the logarithmic
transformation of the variable taxation, the skewness and kurtosis test correspond to
values -0.2 and 3.9, respectively. A reference of substantial range from normality happens
when an absolute skew value is greater than 2 and an absolute kurtosis value is greater
than 7 (West, Finch and Curran, 1995). According to what has been said so far, and taking
into account the sample size, these values are perfectly acceptable as an approximation to
a normal distribution.
Additionally also for most of the independent variables, the skewness and kurtosis test
indicated the absence of a normal distribution. The equivalent logarithmic
transformations were implemented for these cases too.
In this type of models, the meaning of the coefficients is specific and so it is critical a
correct interpretation for an unadulterated understanding of the results. Thus, in cases
where both the explained and explanatory variables are log-transformed variables, the
interpretation is given as an expected percentage change in Y when X increases by a
certain percentage (Benoit, 2011).
It is also important to point out that the larger the standard error, the greater the
uncertainty about the estimated parameter value. With large samples, parameters can be
estimated very accurately and so standard errors are frequently quite small compared to
the coefficient estimates (Wooldridge, 2012). In consequence, t statistics assume high
values and therefore the variables are statistically significant at very low levels of
significance. Thus, all of our variables are statistically significant at rather small
significance levels. Particularly when we are working with large samples (as in our case),
it is imperative to interpret the magnitude of the coefficients, in addition to looking at t
statistics (Wooldridge, 2012).
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3.5. Estimations and Results
Following the above considerations, at this stage we are in the position to follow our
intentions with the aim of being able to answer our research question. To this end, we
carried out various estimates.
In Table 10 are summarized some results of the estimates carried out in order to assess
the differences between the fiscal effort made by MNEs compared to DEs.
An overview of this table allows us to identify a relatively constant pattern for certain
variables across all our estimates. As said above, all variables are statistically significant
at a very low significance level (1% level). However, we should focus primarily our
analysis on the magnitude of the coefficients.
In our base regression, (1), the variables mne, lempl and lage have a positive impact on
taxes owed by enterprises, where MNE status is associated to a 0.39% increase in
taxation, a one percent increase in number of employees is connected to a 0.84% increase
in taxes and a one percent increase in age is linked to a 0.35% increase in taxes owed.
Introducing the variable lsales to regression (1) we obtain regression (2). In this case, the
coefficient allied to MNEs falls from 0.39 to 0.09, the number of employees now has a
negative impact on taxation, although the associated coefficient is low (-0.07) and a one
percent increase in age is connected with a 0.05% increase in tax effort. The introduced
variable, lsales, has a strong impact on taxes owed, assuming the coefficient 0.99, i.e., a
one percent increase in sales is associated with a 0.99% increase in taxation.
Adding the variable lgearing to regression (1) we reach regression (3). Herein, there are
no substantial differences regarding to existing variables. Concerning the variable
introduced, lgearing, we obtain a coefficient of -0.09.
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Table 10: Log-log model results (Period 2005-2013)
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: ltaxation(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
mne 0.3897785 *(258.99)
0.0868317 *
(64.71)
0.3750364 *
(221.19)
0.4517958 *
(284.92)
0.0916158 *
(67.60)
0.3881308 *
(257.27)
0.0544297 *
(34.80)
lempl 0.8391186 *(898.90)
-0.0732885 *
(-68.26)
0.833008 *
(820.55)
0.8348803 *
(890.61)
-0.0849993 *
(-68.80)
lsales 0.9940175 *(1,267.26)
1.005898 *
(1,055.44)
lfixasset 0.510409 *(900.32)
ltotasset 0.9271735 *(1,527.30)
lgearing -0.0940282 *(-144.73)
-0.1541544 *
(-252.65)
-0.1308521 *
(-259.03)
-0.1152044 *
(-207.54)
lage 0.3467563 *(285.17)
0.0493591 *
(46.25)
0.2520444 *
(182.09)
0.1281336 *
(97.90)
-0.0955968 *
(-86.76)
0.3490777 *
(286.45)
0.0075495 *
(6.12)
mining 0.2401712 *(37.22)
0.2275403 *
(38.06)
manuf -0.0203671 *(-19.33)
0.0821953 *
(83.95)
utilit 0.292147 *(85.48)
0.1755125 *
(57.88)
construc -0.0411627 *(-28.76)
0.0730494 *
(53.58)
cons -0.1559123 *(-91.45)
-2.00629 *
(-978.48)
0.1951029 *
(85.32)
0.236268 *
(113.58)
-1.309118 *
(-596.89)
-0.1476766 *
(-85.39)
-1.813677 *
(-660.94)
R-squared 0.3062 0.5477 0.3174 0.3305 0.5444 0.3085 0.5421
F-Statistic . . . . . . .
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. Observations 3,067,329 2,691,886 2,330,426 2,562,816 2,505,071 3,067,329 2,035,014
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
Note: * stands for significance at 1% level, ** means significance at 5% level and *** denotes significance for 10% level; t-statistics are reported in the
parentheses below the parameter estimate.
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Replacing the variable lempl by lfixasset to proxy the firm’s size and introducing
lgearing to regression (1), we obtain regression (4). The coefficients associated to mne
and lage remain with a positive impact on taxation and lgearing also continues to have a
negative effect on tax effort. A one percent increase in fixed assets is associated with a
0.51% increase in taxes owed. Furthermore, we decided to replace the variable lempl by
ltotasset and introduce the variable lgearing to regression (1), obtaining regression (5).
The coefficient related tomne remain with a positive impact on taxes owed although with
less magnitude and lgearing also continues to have a negative effect on tax effort. The
variable ltotasset has a similar effect on the tax effort to the effect of sales in the
regression (2). Furthermore, lage presents a negative impact, although the associated
coefficient is low (-0.10).
Finally, we introduced the sectoral variables mining, manuf, utilit and construc in the
regressions (6) and (7). Compared to the regression (6), the regression (7) further includes
the variables lsales and lgearing, which maintain the sign and the intensity of their impact
on taxation. As for impact of mne and lage on taxation, they remain positive in both,
although stronger in the regression (6) than regression (7) (coefficient 0.39 versus 0.05
and 0.35 versus 0.01, respectively). The coefficient associated to lempl becomes once
again negative (conjugated with lsales), from 0.83 in regression (6) to -0.08 in regression
(7). As for sectoral dummies, the interpretation is mixed for manuf and construc, where
in addition to the effect being very small, the signal of the same is not unchanging for
both variables. On the contrary, regardingmining and utilit, we denote a positive impact
on taxes owed by corporations. More specifically, an enterprise in the mining sector is
associated to a 0.24% increase in taxation according to regression (6) and a 0.23%
increase according to regression (7). Concerning utilities, the coefficient is 0.29 in
regression (6) and 0.18 in regression (7).
In sum, the coefficient associated to the presence of a multinational company is positive
in all estimations carried out, and despite having a substantially smaller effect when we
include sales or total assets as determinants of the taxation level, it keeps the same sign
of influence. That said, being a multinational company translates into a positive
correlation with the fiscal effort made by companies. This opinion is shared by Egger et
al. (2010b) only for low-tax countries, since for high-tax countries the authors deliberate
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that tax level of MNEs is lower than those of DEs, considering the existence of significant
savings on profit tax for multinationals operating in high-tax countries. Not corroborating
neither denying the existence of a significant saving in tax profit by multinational
companies, what our results reflect is that the MNEs have higher tax level than DEs in
the EU-28 as a whole. While GAO report (GAO, 2008) found that multinational
enterprises pay less taxes than domestic counterparts in the US, our results show that the
opposite was the case in the EU-28 for the period 2005-2013.
Additionally, we proposed to investigate whether DEs with foreign subsidiaries pay more
taxes than DEs without foreign subsidiaries. To this end, we conducted another set of
estimations presented in Table 11.
As for domestic companies, we found a substantial effect on taxes owed by companies
when they have foreign subsidiaries. In parallel to the results found in the previous
analysis, here too the effect is mitigated when we introduce the independent variable sales
to regressions. Keeping in mind the effect of being an MNE on taxation, we conclude that
the effect associated to DEs with foreign subsidiaries is slightly larger in all regressions,
with the exception of regression (4).
In our regression (1), the variables dew, lempl and lage have a positive impact on taxes
owed by companies, where a DE with foreign subsidiary is associated with a 0.45%
increase in taxation, a one percent increase in number of employees is connected with a
0.86% increase in taxes and a one percent increase in age is linked with a 0.32% increase
in taxes owed.
Once again, introducing the variable lsales to regression (1) we obtain regression (2). In
this case, the coefficient connected to DEs with foreign subsidiaries decreases from 0.45
to 0.16, the number of employees now have a negative impact on taxation, although the
associated coefficient is low (-0.07) and a one percent increase in age is connected with
a 0.04% increase in tax effort. The introduced variable, lsales, has the same strong impact
(even the same magnitude) on taxes owed as the previous analysis.
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Table 11: Log-log model results (Period 2005-2013)
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: ltaxation(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dew 0.4477744 *(198.77)
0.1612412 *
(82.15)
0.4018676 *
(173.17)
0.3709142 *
(165.87)
0.0824551 *
(44.42)
0.4514004 *
(200.52)
0.1564731 *
(77.06)
lempl 0.8617509 *(929.14)
-0.0728754 *
(-68.00)
0.8552051 *
(849.99)
0.8570196 *
(920.49)
-0.0873443 *
(-70.83)
lsales 0.9944788 *(1,277.02)
1.002568 *
(1,063.07)
lfixasset 0.5219458 *(908.66)
ltotasset 0.9332125 *(1,564.41)
lgearing -0.1108153 *(-170.70)
-0.1743902 *
(-284.93)
-0.134886 *
(-268.53)
-0.1184509 *
(-215.16)
lage 0.3221246 *(263.98)
0.0414586 *
(39.06)
0.2295933 *
(165.33)
0.1099821 *
(83.25)
-0.1019459 *
(-92.88)
0.3247195 *
(265.65)
0.0026926 *
(2.20)
mining 0.25549 *(39.43)
0.2301892 *
(38.55)
manuf -0.030829 *(-29.12)
0.0784689 *
(80.14)
utilit 0.281887 *(82.15)
0.1775976 *
(58.65)
construc -0.0676595 *(-47.26)
0.0701854 *
(51.65)
cons -0.1389613 *(-80.69)
-1.997888 *
(-972.42)
0.2343811 *
(101.45)
0.286025 *
(135.30)
-1.310951 *
(-592.53)
-0.1241985 *
(-71.09)
-1.788504 *
(-647.86)
R-squared 0.3000 0.5481 0.3119 0.3166 0.5440 0.3027 0.5432
F-Statistic . . . . . . .
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. Observations 3,067,329 2,691,886 2,330,426 2,562,816 2,505,071 3,067,329 2,035,014
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
Note: * stands for significance at 1% level, ** means significance at 5% level and *** denotes significance for 10% level; t-statistics are reported in the
parentheses below the parameter estimate.
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Similarly, adding the variable lgearing to regression (1) we reach regression (3). Here
too, there are no considerable differences concerning the variables considered. About the
added variable, lgearing, we obtain a coefficient of -0.11, i.e., a one percent increase in
the gearing ratio is connected to a 0.11% increase in taxes owed.
Continuing to follow the same procedure of the above analysis, we replaced the variable
lempl by lfixasset to proxy the firm’s size and introduced lgearing to regression (1),
reaching regression (4). The coefficients associated to dew and lage persist with a positive
impact on tax level and lgearing also continues to have a negative effect on tax effort. A
one percent increase in fixed assets is associated with a 0.52% increase in taxes owed.
Additionally, we decided to replace the variable lempl by ltotasset and introduce the
variable lgearing to regression (1), obtaining regression (5). The coefficient related to
dew remain with a positive impact on tax level although it is the lowest of all regression
(0.08) and lgearing also endures to have a negative effect on tax effort. The variable
ltotasset has again a similar effect on the tax effort to the effect of sales in regression (2).
More, lage presents a negative impact, although the associated coefficient is low (-0.10).
To conclude, we introduced the sectoral variables mining,manuf, utilit and construc in
the regressions (6) and (7). Compared to the regression (6), the regression (7) further
includes the variables lsales and lgearing, which maintain the sign and the magnitude of
their impact on taxation. As for impact of dew and lage on taxation, they remain positive
in both, although stronger in the regression (6) than regression (7) (coefficient 0.45 versus
0.16 and 0.32 versus nil to two decimal places, respectively). The coefficient associated
with lempl becomes once again negative (conjugated with lsales), from 0.86 in regression
(6) to -0.09 in regression (7). As for sectoral dummies, the interpretation is identical to
that performed in the previous analysis. Formanuf and construc, in addition to the effect
being very small, the signal of the same is varying. On the contrary, regarding mining
and utilit, we note a positive impact on taxes owed by corporations. More specifically,
an enterprise in mining is associated to a 0.26% increase in taxation according to
regression (6) and a 0.23% increase agreeing to regression (7). The coefficients associated
with utilities are 0.28% and 0.18%, nearly unchanged when compared with the previous
analysis.
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In short, the coefficient associated with ownership of foreign subsidiaries by domestic
firms is positive in all our estimations. Again, the magnitude of the effect is mitigated by
the presence of sales and total assets as explanatory factors of the tax level supported by
the companies. To conclude, we can say that DEs with foreign subsidiaries are associated
to higher taxation levels when compared to DEs without foreign subsidiaries.
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4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The main goal of this study was to assess whether multinational firms pay more or less
taxes than their domestic counterparts, an underdeveloped issue in existing empirical
literature. For such aim, we proceeded to a detailed literature review with regard to key
issues related to the topic (yet not exactly addressing it), notably the extensive literature
on the importance of taxes in location decisions of investments by MNEs. We found that
although the sensitivity of FDI to taxation is a much discussed topic, no consensus exists
in the literature on this matter. In fact, the literature remains fairly hesitant concerning
whether FDI may be sensitive to tax incentives. Specifically regarding to our main focus
of analysis, so far little exists, at least in terms of broad-based, large-scale studies.
However we gathered some relevant findings on this topic and here also we found unclear
conclusions.
We then followed with an empirical analysis in order to respond to our main research
question. The study is built on the data drawn from the extremely inclusive Amadeus
database (the best of its kind and the most appropriate for our purposes) and is conducted
for a sample in the EU-28 context, testing data for 28 countries using a log-log model and
covering the period 2005-2013.
Our main result points to a positive and significant relation between MNEs and taxes due
(as measured by the logarithm of taxation) by companies. We found that being a
multinational company translates into a 0.40% increase in the tax level, approximately.
This figure drops to about 0.09% when we introduced the variable sales in explaining the
taxes due. That said, we are able to state that there are higher tax levels associated to
MNEs (relative to their domestic counterparts).
Additionally, we proposed to assess whether DEs with foreign subsidiaries paid more
taxes than DEs without foreign subsidiaries. To that, we estimated another set of
regressions and concluded that companies with foreign subsidiaries are positively and
significantly associated to the tax level (compared to DEs without foreign subsidiaries).
Here also, the variable sales mitigates the effect on taxation.
The measures of a firm’s size confirm our predictions and exert a positive influence on
tax level. The leverage ratio measured by gearing and the maturity of the firm also
41
corroborate, respectively, the expected negative and positive relation to taxation.
Ultimately, as for the sectors of activity, only the mining and utilities sectors seem to
indicate a positive impact on taxation.
Bearing in mind these results, some policy implications can be drawn. Since MNEs and
DEs with foreign subsidiaries appear associated to higher levels of taxes due,
governments, in order to raise their income and improve their budgetary conditions
(ceteris paribus) should endeavor to create appealing conditions for both the attraction of
foreign MNE subsidiaries and for the internationalization via FDI of their domestic
enterprises. In fact, this idea has been adopted by some countries, and this has been the
path followed by several countries in recent years, who have been implementing inward
FDI-friendly policies, together with outward FDI promoting measures.
Throughout this work, we found various limitations in the dataset (albeit it is the most
comprehensive and complete that is available), such as the abstention from answering by
companies (with the glaring case of Cyprus explained in detail in a specific Appendix),
the loss of observations that our sample suffered during the necessary process of data
treatment, and the fact that to ascertain whether some companies pay more taxes than
others, we needed a variable of effectively paid taxes (which the database did not provide,
so we had to work, as usual in econometrics, with the best available proxy).
However, and despite the constraints faced during the development of this work, we
managed to organize and use a vast set of extremely robust data. Our research is focused
on a still striking number of approximately 3.5 million observations, which leads to a
great deal of comfort when performing our analysis. Bearing all this in mind, our large-
scale cross-country study in the EU-28 context contributes to the literature in an ambitious
and innovative way.
Regarding avenues for future research, it would be useful for such research to evaluate
the differences in the tax levied by each country or group of countries within the European
Union. Thus, we could measure the differences in the tax effort made by companies in
the various regions within the EU and also assess which are the most and least attractive
regions for implementing companies.
42
There are other gaps to be fulfilled by future research. Further studies on this theme
should address the same research question with a dependent variable that would be a
measure of effective taxes or effective taxes over earnings before taxes to ascertain with
more accuracy the kind of relationships posited. It would still be interesting to make a
similar study to that made in this dissertation by addressing more details and being more
discriminant, for instance dividing the countries into distinct groups: northern, southern,
western, eastern and central Europe, or others. Time limitations prevented us from
growing further, as this research (the simple construction of the dataset and then all the
analysis and content of the dissertation) was an extremely demanding endeavor.
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Appendix
Table 12: Extracted observations: Active companies with at least 10 employees
Country
Number of
active
companies
with at least
10 employees
MNEs DEs
DEs with
foreign
subsidiary
DEs
without
foreign
subsidiary
Austria 21,687 2,548 19,139 937 18,202
Belgium 30,369 4,380 25,989 1,340 24,649
Bulgaria 43,149 1,710 41,439 104 41,335
Croatia 10,542 855 9,687 272 9,415
Cyprus 152 7 145 7 138
Czech Republic 51,764 5,365 46,399 788 45,611
Denmark 7,331 1,273 6,058 1,061 4,997
Estonia 5,802 966 4,836 85 4,751
Finland 16,767 1,202 15,565 906 14,659
France 61,044 6,547 54,497 2,159 52,338
Germany 187,283 12,609 174,674 4,395 170,279
Greece 9,451 901 8,550 176 8,374
Hungary 28,990 1,131 27,859 285 27,574
Ireland 4,596 1,176 3,420 271 3,149
Italy 139,052 6,941 132,111 5,547 126,564
Latvia 10,537 1,695 8,842 99 8,743
Lithuania 18,074 989 17,085 176 16,909
Luxembourg 796 311 485 59 426
Malta 184 45 139 18 121
Netherlands 53,644 4,651 48,993 1,944 47,049
Poland 85,125 1,474 83,651 152 83,499
Portugal 35,749 2,458 33,291 899 32,392
Romania 53,947 8,477 45,470 70 45,400
Slovakia 22,220 2,691 19,529 278 19,251
Slovenia 5,947 691 5,256 204 5,052
Spain 95,204 6,176 89,028 3,345 85,683
Sweden 36,671 2,843 33,828 1,892 31,936
United
Kingdom 60,807 13,378 47,429 3,430 43,999
EU 28 1,096,884 93,490 1,003,394 30,899 972,495
Source: Own elaboration.
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Explanation – Cyprus
On its website (www.oecd.org), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) indicates that in half of OECD countries, micro enterprises (those
with less than 10 employees) account on average for more than 90% of total enterprises.
Based on their information (for 2010 or latest available year), we arrive at an average
value for the EU-23 countries (data for Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Malta were
not available) of 91.74% of micro on total enterprises which confirms the above for not
only by half of the countries, but to 23 out of the EU-28 countries. Figure 1 and Table 13
both clarify this distribution, identifying the percentage of enterprises by size classes.
Aware of this reality, our sample corresponds merely to the other 8%, approximately, as
our data exclude micro enterprises. Hence, we are dealing with a “large minority” of
European companies (which does not compromise the merit of our analysis given the still
extremely high number of observations involved).
Even so, the case of Cyprus clearly stands out. Taking into account the overall picture of
the Amadeus database we realized that something seemed peculiar with Cyprus’s
observations, which included only 152 active companies with at least 10 employees in
2013. The option “Coverage” in the Amadeus database enabled to clarify this abnormal
situation, selecting the field “Breakdown of companies according to main world
regions/countries” and finalizing with “Versus employment”. Analyzing in great depth
the collected information in the database, we could understand that the origin of the
reduced Cyprus’s number of observations is the high non-response by Cypriot companies
as for their number of employees, a limitation that is totally beyond our control. Table 14
shows that Cyprus has 21,106 companies, of which 18,597 have no data for employment
variable. While the average for EU-28 countries for non-response to the employment
variable is around 2%, for Cyprus it is 88%. The peculiar case encountered is thus duly
explained.
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Percentage, 2010 or latest available year
Figure 1: Enterprises by size classes (EU-23)
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD website.
Note: Data for Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Malta were not available.
Table 13: Percentages of enterprises by size classes (EU-23)
Country Employees1-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 250+
Austria 87.43 6.95 3.68 1.60 0.33
Belgium 93.98 3.15 1.92 0.78 0.16
Bulgaria 90.93 4.65 2.80 1.40 0.22
Czech Republic 95.73 2.18 1.27 0.68 0.14
Denmark 89.36 5.56 3.32 1.48 0.28
Estonia 88.88 5.49 3.53 1.85 0.25
Finland 92.07 4.17 2.41 1.08 0.27
France 94.21 2.92 1.90 0.80 0.17
Germany 82.27 9.85 4.86 2.55 0.47
Hungary 94.69 3.03 1.41 0.73 0.14
Italy 94.63 3.46 1.32 0.50 0.08
Latvia 89.23 5.66 3.26 1.64 0.23
Lithuania 89.02 5.59 3.38 1.77 0.25
Luxembourg 87.76 5.95 3.78 2.03 0.48
Netherlands 93.56 3.15 2.01 1.08 0.20
Poland 95.38 1.81 1.56 1.04 0.21
Portugal 94.92 2.87 1.49 0.63 0.09
Romania 89.00 5.56 3.40 1.71 0.33
Slovak Republic 95.68 2.68 0.95 0.57 0.12
Slovenia 93.60 3.34 1.80 1.06 0.20
Spain 93.79 3.56 1.85 0.68 0.12
Sweden 94.48 2.91 1.67 0.79 0.16
United Kingdom 89.36 5.74 3.00 1.55 0.35
EU-23 91.74 4.36 2.46 1.22 0.23
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD website.
Note: Data for Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Malta were not available.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 250+
53
Table 14: Breakdown of companies of each country according to levels of employment (EU-28)
Source: Own elaboration based on Amadeus database.
* Includes companies for which the value is estimated.
Last data update: 10/07/2015
Employment*
World
regions/countries Below 5 5 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 149 150 to 499 500 to 999 1000 to 4999 Over 5000 Not available Total Not available / Total
Austria (AT) 175,192 27,630 17,402 12,230 5,563 2,334 594 444 93 3,575 245,057 1%
Belgium (BE) 366,414 49,092 25,287 15,271 6,187 2,852 556 453 57 3,617 469,786 1%
Bulgaria (BG) 356,088 49,190 23,307 15,564 6,065 2,074 338 184 12 4,728 457,550 1%
Croatia (HR) 94,609 12,754 6,896 3,879 1,640 619 112 58 8 1,019 121,594 1%
Cyprus (CY) 172 1,583 137 344 108 96 20 36 13 18,597 21,106 88%
Czech Republic (CZ) 313,886 39,763 37,066 28,715 14,011 8,743 1,487 1,213 376 7,121 452,381 2%
Denmark (DK) 133,502 32,993 28,130 26,784 17,012 5,802 1,031 681 160 425 246,520 0%
Estonia (EE) 101,529 7,626 3,836 2,250 898 266 35 20 0 1,492 117,952 1%
Finland (FI) 241,420 20,589 11,778 7,138 3,170 1,256 277 253 53 3,474 289,408 1%
France (FR) 1,989,627 257,570 115,654 70,274 29,447 10,760 2,092 1,550 393 61,872 2,539,239 2%
Germany (DE) 991,291 169,165 126,171 93,744 46,239 16,162 3,567 2,860 583 30,451 1,480,233 2%
Greece (GR) 9,268 5,213 5,011 3,927 1,683 613 105 94 12 7 25,933 0%
Hungary (HU) 286,173 65,534 49,955 49,550 36,427 15,766 3,865 3,289 694 7,706 518,959 1%
Ireland (IE) 136,972 10,524 6,508 4,997 2,737 969 256 188 52 14,596 177,799 8%
Italy (IT) 774,388 143,829 94,505 50,719 20,033 6,673 1,342 995 203 2,935 1,095,622 0%
Latvia (LV) 122,640 18,098 6,626 3,838 1,559 419 56 28 7 10 153,281 0%
Lithuania (LT) 79,955 17,773 9,345 6,487 3,545 822 130 55 6 348 118,466 0%
Luxembourg (LU) 14,558 2,636 1,725 1,292 794 437 123 166 62 1,563 23,356 7%
Malta (MT) 15,274 383 305 328 285 141 36 21 3 1,886 18,662 10%
Netherlands (NL) 917,151 105,675 51,455 30,425 14,056 5,277 1,196 1,111 284 4,581 1,131,211 0%
Poland (PL) 58,808 894,969 19,947 102,576 18,447 15,745 2,760 1,922 326 1,342 1,116,842 0%
Portugal (PT) 296,416 53,416 24,995 13,448 5,058 1,426 236 187 21 4,555 399,758 1%
Romania (RO) 673,854 62,038 31,917 18,768 7,314 2,506 433 263 30 0 797,123 0%
Slovakia (SK) 199,481 17,323 10,127 6,730 3,123 806 149 94 12 17,739 255,584 7%
Slovenia (SI) 64,344 7,589 3,917 2,102 1,044 338 67 34 2 4,744 84,181 6%
Spain (ES) 650,270 131,216 69,924 40,004 14,162 4,968 1,016 815 218 19,935 932,528 2%
Sweden (SE) 492,990 45,989 24,029 15,468 7,621 2,950 711 670 184 282 590,894 0%
United Kingdom
(GB) 2,565,037 94,261 55,870 41,440 33,791 16,617 4,060 3,865 994 84,026 2,899,961 3%
EU28 12,121,309 2,344,421 861,825 668,292 302,019 127,437 26,650 21,549 4,858 302,626 16,780,986 2%
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Figure 2: Process of treatment of the data in the sample
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
Active companies with at least 10 employees in 2013:
1,096,884 in each of the nine years
TOTAL: 9,871,956
Data (variable taxation) for all the 9 years:
431,237 in 2005
474,517 in 2006
513,427 in 2007
541,334 in 2008
572,434 in 2009
610,857 in 2010
646,645 in 2011
676,146 in 2012
690,035 in 2013
TOTAL: 5,156,632
Only mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction and services:
395,516 in 2005
434,308 in 2006
468,898 in 2007
492,919 in 2008
520,348 in 2009
554,443 in 2010
585,259 in 2011
611,267 in 2012
538,774 in 2013
TOTAL: 4,601,732
Companies with date of incorporation until 2013:
392,454 in 2005
429,366 in 2006
461,354 in 2007
482,696 in 2008
510,378 in 2009
543,625 in 2010
569,507 in 2011
594,437 in 2012
523,546 in 2013
TOTAL: 4,507,363
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Figure 2: Process of treatment process of the data in the sample (cont.)
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
Companies with date of incorporation until 2013:
392,454 in 2005
429,366 in 2006
461,354 in 2007
482,696 in 2008
510,378 in 2009
543,625 in 2010
569,507 in 2011
594,437 in 2012
523,546 in 2013
TOTAL: 4,507,363
Observations resulting from the logarithmic transformation variables:
319,873 in 2005
357,210 in 2006
382,449 in 2007
383,475 in 2008
390,271 in 2009
424,911 in 2010
435,793 in 2011
440,039 in 2012
392,531 in 2013
TOTAL: 3,526,552
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Table 15: Companies exhibiting maximum value and mean of taxation by country (2005-2013)
Country Company Name
Highest Value of
Taxation *
(th €)
Mean
(Taxation) by
Country *
(th €)
Austria OMV GAS & POWER GMBH 2,606,777 814.8
Belgium B.A.S.F. ANTWERPEN 276,637 308.1
Bulgaria ЕВРОФУТБОЛ ООД 28,214 58.6
Croatia INA, D.D. 79,436 88.1
Cyprus CELESTYAL SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED 10,841 306.3
Czech Republic CEZ, A. S. 365,810 185.8
Denmark MAERSK OIL QATAR A/S 2,075,003 1,108.8
Estonia ERICSSON EESTI AS 13,291 59.4
Finland NOKIA OYJ 1,348,000 383.3
France TOTAL SA 3,504,000 601.6
Germany VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 2,630,000 845.9
Greece Ο.Π.Α.Π. ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΠΡΟΓΝΩΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΑΓΩΝΩΝΠΟΔΟΣΦΑΙΡΟΥ Α.Ε. 351,891 421.8
Hungary MOL MAGYAR OLAJ- ÉS GÁZIPARI NYILVÁNOSANMUKÖDO RÉSZVÉNYTÁRSASÁG 154,031 52.7
Ireland ACCENTURE PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 786,000 1,683.6
Italy TELECOM ITALIA SPA 2,098,935 343.2
Latvia LATVENERGO AS 37,696 63.7
Lithuania AB ORLEN LIETUVA 34,574 84.2
Luxembourg ARCELORMITTAL SOURCING SCA 612,673 1,355.8
Malta ACTAVIS LIMITED 21,703 1,202.8
Netherlands SHELL NEDERLAND B.V. 5,782,000 3,852.2
Poland KGHM POLSKA MIEDZ S.A. 524,468 568.8
Portugal MEO - SERVIÇOS DE COMUNICAÇÕES EMULTIMÉDIA, S.A. 262,133 112.4
Romania OMV PETROM SA 183,542 51.4
Slovakia SLOVENSKÝ PLYNÁRENSKÝ PRIEMYSEL, A.S. 168,136 167.7
Slovenia KRKA, TOVARNA ZDRAVIL, D.D., NOVO MESTO 44,589 142.6
Spain TELEFONICA MOVILES ESPAÑA SA 1,257,332 330.1
Sweden ASTRAZENECA AB 1,248,430 389.8
United Kingdom ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC 18,818,710 4,529.7
EU 28 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC 18,818,710 617.9
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
* Values for the period 2005-2013.
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Table 16: Variable names and definitions
Variable Name Variable Nameon Stata Definition
Taxation ltaxation All taxes related to the accounting period(paid, accrued or deferred)
Multinational
Enterprise mne
Identifies companies owned by a foreign
shareholder
Domestic Enterprise
with Foreign
Subsidiary
dew Identifies domestic companies withforeign subsidiary
Employment lempl Total number of employees included inthe company’s payroll
Sales lsales Total sales
Fixed assets lfixasset
Total amount (after depreciation) of non
current assets (Intangible assets +
Tangible assets + Other fixed assets)
Total assets ltotasset Total assets (Fixed assets + Currentassets)
Leverage lgearing Proportion of a company’s borrowedfunds to its equity
Age lage Companies age in each year of theanalysis period
Mining mining Identifies companies in the mining sector
Manufacturing manuf Identifies companies in themanufacturing sector
Utilities utilit Identifies companies in the utilities sector
Construction construc Identifies companies in the constructionsector
Source: Own elaboration based on Amadeus database.
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Table 17: Correlation matrix of all variables used in the various estimations
ltaxation mne dew Lempl lsales lfixasset ltotasset lgearing lage mining manuf utilit construc
ltaxation 1.0000
mne 0.2464 1.0000
dew 0.2138 -0.0762 1.0000
lempl 0.5043 0.2628 0.2175 1.0000
lsales 0.7302 0.3063 0.2477 0.7170 1.0000
lfixasset 0.5399 0.1805 0.2278 0.6066 0.6811 1.0000
ltotasset 0.7271 0.2806 0.2651 0.6816 0.8896 0.8392 1.0000
lgearing -0.1093 -0.1104 0.0194 -0.0287 -0.0097 0.0859 0.0126 1.0000
lage 0.2461 0.0224 0.0919 0.2624 0.3230 0.3417 0.3761 -0.0645 1.0000
mining 0.0235 0.0083 -0.0030 0.0117 0.0102 0.0509 0.0352 -0.0052 0.0278 1.0000
manuf 0.0729 0.0419 0.0798 0.1270 0.0695 0.1475 0.1104 0.0408 0.1064 -0.0494 1.0000
utilit 0.0774 -0.0051 -0.0101 0.0640 0.0793 0.1402 0.1189 0.0067 -0.0044 -0.0108 -0.0998 1.0000
construc -0.0622 -0.0900 -0.0391 -0.0582 -0.1036 -0.1444 -0.0974 -0.0157 -0.0519 -0.0277 -0.2555 -0.0561 1.0000
Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 12.0.
